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Self-Determination, Justice, and a
“Peace Process”:
Irish Nationalism, the Contemporary Colonial
Experience, and the Good Friday Agreement
Amy Maguire*
Abstract
In a sense, the “Irish peace process” is a success story, as it has largely
achieved a shift from military/paramilitary violent conflict to political
conflict, played out through democratic institutions. However, the
perception that a peace has been achieved belies the fact that the metaconflict remains unresolved. This article engages with the Irish peace
process in the context of the collective human right of self-determination. I
argue that self-determination retains a mission of liberation in the twentyfirst century, particularly in relation to contemporary colonial cases, such as
that of Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland. In this context, I explore the
Irish peace accord, the Good Friday Agreement (“the Agreement”). While
the Agreement has shifted the conflict largely into the realm of political
debate, it has been less effective in promoting a peace that is grounded in
justice. Indeed, some have recently argued that the people of Northern
Ireland must choose between peace and justice. In this article, I question
this proposed binary and argue that it is possible and worthwhile to pursue
both justice and peace. An effective process of transitional justice for the
*
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North of Ireland can acknowledge colonialism as well as its impacts in
Ireland, and can promote self-determination. Such a process can provide the
foundation for the Good Friday Agreement to be implemented in ways that
promote not only an end to violent conflict, but a just and lasting peace.

I. INTRODUCTION
“In places torn by war, there is all too often a choice to be made
between justice and peace. We may want both; we may cry out for
both. But the bleak truth is, we cannot have both.”
Jonathan Freedland1
“Peace” has a particular connotation in terms of the conflict between Irish
nationalist efforts to achieve Irish unification, and British unionist efforts to
maintain Northern Ireland as a province of the United Kingdom.2 In a sense,
the Irish peace process is a success story, as it has largely achieved a shift
from military/paramilitary violent conflict to political conflict, played out
through democratic institutions.3 However, the perception that a peace has
been achieved belies the fact that the meta-conflict remains unresolved.

1

Jonathan Freedland, Whatever Gerry Adams’ Past, Peace Takes Precedence over
Justice, THE GUARDIAN, May 3, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2014/may/02/gerry-adams-jean-mcconville-south-africa-painful-compromise.
2
In this article, I use the umbrella term “Irish nationalist” to refer to people and
communities who seek the unification of the two Irish jurisdictions; Northern Ireland
(currently a unit of the United Kingdom) and the Republic of Ireland (an independent
state). I include in the term Irish nationalists those people who would also be identified as
“Irish republicans,” a group that has historically been associated with a physical force
tradition in Irish politics. I also use the umbrella term “British unionist” to refer to people
and communities who seek to maintain the union between Northern Ireland and Great
Britain. I include in this term those people who would also be identified as “British
loyalists,” a term which has been used to identify more extreme elements in the unionist
tradition, including members of the Orange Order and loyalist paramilitary groups.
3
The primary institution is the Northern Ireland Assembly, a consociational parliament,
which exercises some powers devolved from the central UK administration at
Westminster.
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That is, the parties to the conflict “disagree about what caused the
conflict.”4
Further, the peace as it stands in Northern Ireland has not been shaped by
the notion of self-determination. Self-determination is a foundation
principle in the international human rights framework. It is an emancipatory
principle, which acknowledges the right of “peoples” to determine their
own destinies in the political, economic, social, and cultural spheres. The
exercise of self-determination peaked during the decolonisation5 period of
the 1960s and 1970s. Some contemporary commentators assert, however,
that self-determination has a limited role to play in international affairs in
the twenty-first century.6 Therefore, despite the central position of selfdetermination in the international human rights framework, there is a risk
that decolonisation will come to be regarded as a historical phenomenon,
rather than an ongoing imperative. Some contemporary hard cases in selfdetermination, notably the case of Irish nationalists in the North of Ireland,
have already been unjustifiably marginalised in international legal
discourse.
This article engages with matters of peace, law, and violence in the
context of international law, particularly the collective human right of selfdetermination. I argue that self-determination retains a mission of liberation
in the twenty-first century, particularly in relation to contemporary colonial
cases, such as that of Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland.7 The Irish
4

Christine Bell, et al., Justice Discourses in Transition, 13 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 305,
316 (2004).
5
Throughout this article, I use Australian English spelling rather than US English
spelling.
6
See, e.g., Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination 34 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 1, 31
(1993); Noel Pearson, Uses of Layered Identities, WEEKEND AUSTL., Nov. 18, 2006, at
28.
7
“Northern Ireland” is the official term for the northeastern six counties of the island of
Ireland, which is administered as a province of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. The term “Northern Ireland” is often rejected by Irish nationalists
living in that territory, in favour of terms such as “the North of Ireland” or “the Six

VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 2 • 2014

539

540 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

nationalist claim to self-determination is acknowledged in the central
document of the Irish peace process, the Good Friday Agreement.8 Since its
adoption in 1998, the Agreement has come to be widely accepted as the
legal instrument essential to peaceful political progress in Ireland.
The Agreement has succeeded in shifting the nature of the conflict in
Ireland. As a legal institution, the Agreement has promoted peace and
discouraged violence, shifting the conflict largely into the realm of political
debate. However, the Agreement and its outworkings have been less
effective in promoting a peace that is grounded in justice. The pursuit of
justice in post-conflict societies is complicated by the need to frame the past
and acknowledge the significance of past wrongs in order to achieve future
goals.9 As noted above, Freedland recently argued that the people of postconflict societies must choose between peace and justice.10 In a similar
recent comment, Clive Crook argued that Northern Ireland has a long way
to go in the pursuit of post-conflict reconciliation, and that its people are
obliged to settle for peace and truth without also aspiring to justice.11

Counties.” In this article, I use the terms “Northern Ireland” and “the North of Ireland”
interchangeably, in order to acknowledge the competing nationalist identifications of the
two main communities: Irish nationalists and British unionists.
8
See generally Agreement Reached at Multi-Party Negotiations, Belfast, Apr. 10, 1998,
Cm. 3883, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-belfastagreement (hereinafter Good Friday Agreement). The Good Friday Agreement is also
commonly known as the Belfast Agreement. This power sharing accord is typically
known to Irish nationalists in the north of Ireland as the ”Good Friday Agreement,” as it
was signed on Good Friday in 1998. As with the terms “Northern Ireland” and “North of
Ireland,” the language surrounding the agreement is contentious, with the ‘Good Friday’
usage suggesting an association with the Catholicism that is the religious context for the
Irish nationalist community. In this article, I will generally use the phrase “the
Agreement,” which is in common use in Ireland.
9
Cillian McGrattan, Policing Politics: Framing the Past in Post-Conflict Divided
Societies, 21 DEMOCRATIZATION 389, 390 (2014).
10
Freedland, supra note 1.
11
Clive Crook, Northern Ireland Can’t Have Peace and Justice, BLOOMBERG VIEW
May 6, 2014, http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-05-06/northern-ireland-cant-have-both-peace-and-justice.
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This proposed peace-justice binary presents particular challenges for
those who have suffered the most in conflict, namely victims of violence.
According to Graham Dawson, contradictions between peace processes and
the desire for justice
are especially acute for the victims of violence who, confronted by
amnesty and other arrangements designed to draw perpetrators into
a negotiated political settlement, may be forced to choose between
the pursuit of justice and the securing of a peace settlement or the
securing of information about the death of a loved one.12
In this article, I question this peace-justice binary, to argue that it is both
possible and worthwhile to simultaneously pursue justice and peace. I use
the term justice in the context of transitional justice theory, a body of
scholarship that focuses on the promotion of justice in post-conflict
societies. I argue that analysis of the Irish nationalist claim to selfdetermination is currently inadequate, and that this is a key limiting factor
in the capacity of the Good Friday Agreement and its outworkings to
promote both peace and justice. An effective process of transitional justice
for the North of Ireland must acknowledge and address the Irish nationalist
claim to self-determination and the colonial experience it emerges from.
This can provide the foundation for the Agreement to be implemented in
ways that promote not only an end to violent conflict, but also a just and
lasting peace.
In the remainder of this introduction, I explain the three key concepts in
this article, namely (A) the right of self-determination, (B) peace, and (C)
transitional justice. I also explain my methodology. In Part II, I argue that
12

Graham Dawson, The Desire for Justice, Psychic Reparation and the Politics of
Memory in “Post-Conflict” Northern Ireland, 18 RETHINKING HIST.: J. OF THEORY &
PRAC. 265, 266 (2014). See also generally MARIE BREEN SMYTH, TRUTH RECOVERY
AND JUSTICE AFTER CONFLICT: MANAGING VIOLENT PASTS (2007); BRANDON
HAMBER, TRANSFORMING SOCIETIES AFTER POLITICAL VIOLENCE: TRUTH,
RECONCILIATION AND MENTAL HEALTH (2009).

VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 2 • 2014

541

542 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

self-determination retains a mission of liberation for Irish nationalists in
Northern Ireland, whose circumstances evidence a contemporary colonial
experience. In Part III, I introduce the Good Friday Agreement, and
demonstrate that this peace accord acknowledges the legitimacy of the Irish
nationalist self-determination claim. In Part IV, I explore how the
Agreement has shifted the nature of the political conflict in Ireland, and
argue that its capacity to promote a just peace must be continually and
critically assessed. That capacity can be enhanced by attending to the
requirements of transitional justice.
A. The Right of Self-Determination
The right of self-determination is enshrined in common Article 1 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR): “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.”13
Self-determination entails the right of a “people” to choose their own
form of political organisation and relationship to other groups.14 However,
self-determination goes beyond this “essence” of political control, to extend
“full rights in the cultural, economic and political spheres.”15 The right
represents the means for a people “to preserve its cultural, ethnic, historical,
or territorial identity.”16 Self-determination is a foundation principle in the
13

G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/2200 (Dec. 16, 1966). The ICCPR and
ICESCR are the core treaty sources of contemporary international human rights law.
They are distinguished from other treaties by near-universal adoption by members of the
international community.
14
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 553 (6th ed. 2003).
15
Patrick Thornberry, Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of
International Instruments, 38 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 867, 880 (1989).
16
Erica-Irene A. Daes, Some Considerations on the Right of Indigenous Peoples to SelfDetermination, 3 TRANSN’L L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 1, 4–5 (1993).
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body of international human rights law, and the capacity of human beings to
realise their individual human rights is closely tied to the degree to which
their community exercises self-determination.17
The right of self-determination has a revolutionary character, both in the
sense that its origins may be traced to revolutionary movements, and in its
capacity to revolutionise relationships between peoples and states.18 The
principle of self-determination can be traced to the French and US
revolutions.19 However, the principle of self-determination was most
prominently engaged during the decolonisation era of the 1960s and
1970s.20 During this era, colonised peoples around the globe seized upon
the right of self-determination as a vehicle by which the mission of
decolonisation, which Frantz Fanon and others described,21 could be
achieved.22 In the twenty-first century, some have argued that selfdetermination’s mission of decolonisation is almost or entirely complete.23
However, some contemporary hard cases in self-determination have been
unjustifiably marginalised in international legal discourse. Irish nationalists
in Northern Ireland fall into a category of contemporary self-determination
claimants who assert a colonial experience, but do not meet the archaic
17

Héctor Gros Espiell, The Right to Self-Determination: Implementation of United
Nations Resolutions, ¶ 59, United Nations, E/CN.4/Sub.2/405 (1980); S. JAMES ANAYA,
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 ( 1996).
18
Thornberry, supra note 15. Thornberry refers to self-determination as a “concept of
liberation.”
19
ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 11
(1995).
20
ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 196 (2004).
21
FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 41 (Constance Farrington trans.,
1965).
22
Many of these peoples asserted independent statehood through the trusteeship system
of the United Nations. The United Nations records the changes in sovereignty in over 80
former trust and non-self-governing territories. See UNITED NATIONS, TRUST AND NONSELF-GOVERNING TERRITORIES, 1945–1999 (1999), available at http://www.un.org/
en/decolonization/nonselfgov.shtml.
23
See, e.g., Hannum, supra note 6, at 31; Pearson, supra note 6.
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“salt-water” test24 of colonialism. Contemporary legal commentators have
recognised that this test, which aimed to impose predictability by ruling out
claims from peoples not separated by an ocean from their colonisers, was
and remains manifestly unjust.25
B. Peace: Settlement, Resolution, or Reconciliation?
The Irish peace process demonstrates that the meaning of “peace” is
contingent and context-dependent. Herbert Kelman identifies three different
ways in which violent conflict between identity groups can be brought to an
end. The first, conflict settlement, produces agreements (brokered by third
parties) that meet the interests of parties “to the extent that their respective
power positions enable them to prevail.”26 Public support may be based on a
desire for the end of violent conflict but may “not rest in any particular
change in public attitudes toward the adversary.”27 The second, conflict
resolution, moves beyond settlement to change the relationship between
parties, diluting the influence of power or required surveillance in
agreement-making, and encouraging the building of trust and new
understandings of the other.28 The third and final step beyond conflict
resolution, and the “interactive problem-solving framework” resolution can
create, is reconciliation. Good agreements can be tested by their capacity to

24

The “salt-water” test of colonialism required a colonial territory and people to be
geographically and ethnically distinct from the colonising power.
25
Andrew Hurrell, International Law and the Making and Unmaking of Boundaries, in
STATES, NATIONS AND BORDERS: THE ETHICS OF MAKING BOUNDARIES 275, 292
(Allen E. Buchanan & Margaret Moore eds., 2003); David Wippman, Introduction:
Ethnic Claims and International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT
1, 11 (David Wippman ed., 1998).
26
Herbert C. Kelman, Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation: A Social-Psychological
Perspective on Ending Violent Conflict Between Identity Groups, 1 LANDSCAPES OF
VIOLENCE: AN INTERDISC. J. DEVOTED TO STUDY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT, & TRAUMA 1,
1 (2010).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 2.

LAW, PEACE, AND VIOLENCE

Self-Determination, Justice, and a “Peace Process”

enable reconciliation (as a process that evolves over time).29 Reconciliation
is the most challenging form of peace to achieve, as it requires identity
change “by removing the negation of the other as a central component of
one’s own identity.”30
The Good Friday Agreement was, at least in part, an outcome of the
lengthy campaign of resistance mounted by Irish nationalists against the
British state and its administration of Northern Ireland. Indeed, one Sinn
Féin Member of Parliament in the Northern Ireland Assembly, Martina
Anderson, depicted Irish nationalism as a struggle against colonialism.31
The Agreement and its outworkings have achieved a shift from violent and
militarised political conflict to (largely) non-violent political conflict. There
are few who would argue against the legitimacy of this transition,
particularly considering the resounding popular support for the Good Friday
Agreement as expressed in referenda in both Irish jurisdictions.32 On July
28, 2005, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), a key protagonist
of the “physical-force” Irish Republican movement, declared an end to its
armed campaign.33 In its statement, the IRA concluded that the objective of
Irish unity could and would be advanced by “purely political and
democratic programmes” and “exclusively peaceful means,” noting the
“compelling imperative on all sides to build a just and lasting peace.”34 In

29

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
31
Interview with Martina Anderson, Sinn Féin Director of Unionist Engagement, in
Belfast (Mar. 21, 2006). Martina Anderson is an Irish nationalist politician, sitting in the
Northern Ireland Assembly for Sinn Féin, and a former Irish Republican Army (IRA)
Volunteer and prisoner.
32
Some dissident Irish republican groupings remain active in Ireland and assert the
illegitimacy of the Good Friday Agreement and related institutions.
33
Irish Republican Army, Statement on the Ending of the Armed Campaign, CAIN Web
Service (Jul. 25, 2005), available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/ira280705
.htm.
34
Id.
30
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this context, legitimate resistance ought to now be characterised as nonviolent political activity.
However, there is a risk in Ireland that the peace process subsumes the
underlying and unresolved political conflict between the competing visions
for the territory’s future held by Irish nationalists, British unionists, and the
two sovereign states of the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. If
“peace” marginalizes legitimate resistance to colonialism, then it will not
produce justice in the sense of self-determination and, over time, it may
trigger a resurgence in violent conflict. In this context, proactive evaluation
of the Agreement and what it can deliver serves the interests of justice and
self-determination.
C. Transitional Justice
Transitional justice is a set of scholarly enquiries concerned with the
emergence of societies from violent conflict.35 According to Christine Bell,
Colm Campbell, and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “‘transitional justice’
encompasses the legal, moral and political dilemmas that arise in holding
human rights abusers accountable at the end of conflict.”36 Studies in
transitional justice can provide corrective and redemptive visions for justice
after conflict, with their foci on human rights serving to mediate political
divides.37 Transitional justice enquiries have frequently reflected on the
post-conflict circumstances of Northern Ireland.38 These enquiries can assist
in exploring the potential of the Good Friday Agreement, due to their focus
on the capacity of law and legal institutions to contribute to social
transformations. Indeed, the Agreement contains a number of provisions
that could be helpful in developing transitional justice—for example, those
35

Alex Boraine, Transitional Justice as an Emerging Field, 5 (Repairing the Past:
Reparations and Transitions to Democracy, Conference Paper, Mar. 2004).
36
Bell et al., supra note 4, at 305.
37
RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 228 (2000).
38
I will discuss several of these in more detail in Part IV(i) of this article, below.
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that require reform of policing, criminal justice, victims’ rights, human
rights, and the release of paramilitary prisoners.39
As noted above, I advocate for the development of a peace in the North
of Ireland that encompasses—rather than marginalises—a concern for
justice. This position has been strongly asserted by community-based peace
movements in Northern Ireland over many years. For example, former
leader of the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, Monica McWilliams,
wrote in 1995 of women’s “struggle for peace and justice.”40 McWilliams
cited Oonagh Marron, an organiser of the 1994 Clár na mBan41 conference
under the theme “A Woman’s Agenda for Peace”: “It is up to us in the
women’s movement to build an undeniable force, to maintain the pressure
that will ensure that when the politicians talk of peace they mean peace with
justice.”42
This article positions self-determination in relation to both the Irish peace
process (particularly through the lens of the Good Friday Agreement) and
transitional justice theory. In the North of Ireland, self-determination can
serve as the glue that binds the notions of peace and justice, and informs a
peace process capable of achieving reconciliation over time, rather than
mere settlement of violent conflict.

39

Campbell, et al., The Frontiers of Legal Analysis: Reframing the Transition in
Northern Ireland, 66 MODERN L. REV. 317, 338 (2003).
40
Monica McWilliams, Struggling for Peace and Justice: Reflections on Women’s
Activism in Northern Ireland, 6 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 13, 32 (1995).
41
An Irish phrase meaning “women’s agenda.”
42
Oonagh Marron, The Cost of Silencing Voices Like Mine, in UNFINISHED
REVOLUTION: ESSAYS ON THE IRISH WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 38–42 (Fran Devaney et al.
eds., 1989), quoted in Monica McWilliams, Struggling for Peace and Justice: Reflections
on Women’s Activism in Northern Ireland, 6 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 13, 32 (1995).
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D. Methodology
I have provided a more detailed explanation of my methodology
elsewhere.43 This article draws on a combination of doctrinal legal research
and qualitative socio-legal research, with particular emphasis on data
gathered through in-depth research interviews with 14 participants in
Ireland. Analyses of self-determination have typically been highly doctrinal,
and have not followed a bottom-up approach to exploring the justifications
or claims advanced by individual members of claimant groups. In this
article, I privilege the experiences and aspirations of rights claimants to
“talk back” to international law. In doing so, I critique the colonial origins
and biases of the international legal system.
Research participants in this study were targeted due to their experiences
and expertise in self-determination, ensuring that all participants
approached the research project from an informed position and delivered
“information-rich” data through the interviews.44 In the first footnote
referring to each participant, I include a brief statement of his or her
relevant background and/or professional role in relation to the research.
Qualitative research does not seek to make claims of generality,45 but rather
seeks to show valid and reliable connections between the data and the
analysis.46 In the research on which this article is based, I grounded my
findings in the meanings expressed by interview participants by using the

43
Amy Maguire, Contemporary Anti-Colonial Self-Determination Claims and the
Decolonisation of International Law, 22 GRIFFITH L. REV. 238, 242–46 (2013).
44
Jamie Baxter & John Eyles, Evaluating Qualitative Research in Social Geography:
Establishing ‘Rigour’ in Interview Analysis, 22 TRANSACTIONS OF INST. OF BRIT.
GEOGRAPHERS 505, 513 (1997).
45
Ann Chih Lin, Bridging Positivist and Interpretivist Approaches to Qualitative
Methods, 26 POL’Y STUD. J. 162, 163 (1998).
46
Baxter & Eyles, supra note 44, at 512.
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constant comparison method,47 coding frequently raised concepts and using
direct quotations from transcripts.
In this article, I focus on the theme that emerged from data analysis as the
core variable, namely, the contemporary colonial experience of Irish
nationalists in Northern Ireland and the influence of that experience on their
self-determination claims. This core variable recurs frequently throughout
the data, links various data, becomes more detailed through constant
comparison, and has significance in theory generation.48 The core variable
of colonialism, as discussed by interview participants, drew together the
other themes raised in interviews “to form an explanatory whole.”49 The
perspectives of these interviewees on colonialism and the contemporary
Irish nationalist claim to self-determination echo Malcolm X’s assertion:
“You can’t separate peace from freedom, because no one can be at peace
unless he has his freedom.”50 In contemporary, multi-cultural Ireland,
however, the parallel imperative is to ensure that the pursuit of freedom
does not threaten the peace that has been painstakingly negotiated.
Throughout this article, I ask whether the Good Friday Agreement can
promote both peace and justice through self-determination.

47

The process of constant comparison involves constantly comparing data and emerging
analysis to generate a theory. See BARNEY GLASER & ANSELM STRAUSS, THE
DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 104
(1967).
48
Michelle Byrne, Grounded Theory as a Qualitative Research Methodology, 73 ASS’N
OF OPERATING ROOM NURSES J. 1155, 1155 (2001). “Theory generation” refers to the
use of constant comparison and the deep analysis of data to lift data beyond its basic
meanings and to develop abstract theoretical conclusions. See Roy Suddaby, From the
Editors: What Grounded Theory Is Not, 49 ACAD. OF MGMNT J. 633, 636 (2006).
49
ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH:
TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING GROUNDED THEORY 146 (1998).
50
Malcolm X, Speech in New York City, “Prospects for Freedom in 1965” (Jan. 7,
1965), in MALCOLM X SPEAKS: SELECTED SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS 147 (1965).
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II. SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE MISSION OF LIBERATION IN
IRELAND
A. The Meaning of Self-determination from Irish Nationalist
Perspectives
In this section, I briefly consider some of the Irish interviewees’
perspectives on the meaning of the right of self-determination. This
provides context for the subsequent exploration of the contemporary
colonial experience of Irish nationalists in the North of Ireland. All 14
participants accepted the international legal definition of the right as a
starting point, and each then went on to apply the definition in practical
terms. For example, Bríd Rodgers acknowledged the independence aspect
of self-determination, but went on to note that this aspect of the right is
complicated in the Irish context:
The issue [in Ireland] is that there are two sets of people on the
island who see self-determination differently. The only way to
solve that is to get to a context where you accept the legitimacy of
both, but you provide a context where they can work together, and
eventually heal, and move on to self-determination.51
Paul O’Connor agreed that all of the people of the island of Ireland are
entitled to decide their destiny together.52
To Eoin Ó Broin, self-determination operates on three levels: the nation,
the community, and the individual. Along with balancing these three “sites”
of self-determination, he argued that the right must also be balanced with
51

Interview with Bríd Rodgers, Social Democratic and Labour Party (hereinafter
SDLP), Lurgan, Ireland (Mar. 9, 2006). Bríd Rodgers was one of the first Ministers in the
devolved Northern Ireland Executive, elected for the Social Democratic and Labour Party
(SDLP), a centrist Irish nationalist party, and a founding activist in the civil rights
movement.
52
Interview with Paul O’Connor, Pat Finucane Centre, Derry, Ireland (Mar. 2, 2006).
Paul O’Connor is an Irish nationalist human rights activist, based at the Pat Finucane
Centre in Derry, which represents the families of victims of conflict in their efforts to
gain justice and truth.
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social, economic, political, and cultural rights.53 Both O’Connor and Terry
Enright emphasised the importance of social and cultural freedom as
aspects of self-determination.54 Essential to this multi-faceted conception of
self-determination is the notion of inclusion in governance. Anthony
Coughlan acknowledged that self-determination has been traditionally
understood to refer to independent statehood, but explained that “it also
refers to the state you’re in, and whether it respects your culture and
language, and right to a . . . standard of living, access to jobs, freedom from
discrimination.”55
Another common theme among participants was that self-determination
has to be interpreted on a community level if it is to mean anything to
claimants. According to Margaret Ward,
I think it has to start with people’s lived reality—what difference
will it make to their lives? If they can’t be convinced on that then
that kind of high-level objective wouldn’t move them.56
Ó Broin also emphasised the community aspect of self-determination,
arguing that the right must be primarily concerned with community-based
activism, empowerment, and engagement on issues affecting people in their
everyday lives.57 Niall Murphy provided an example of community

53
Interview with Eoin Ó Broin, Sinn Féin, Belfast, Ireland (Jan. 24, 2006). Eoin Ó Broin
is an Irish nationalist political activist and writer.
54
Interview with Paul O’Connor, supra note 52; Interview with Terry Enright, Human
Rights Consortium, Belfast, Ireland (Feb. 2, 2006). The late Terry Enright was a member
of the Irish nationalist community in Belfast, and a long-time community worker and
human rights activist.
55
Interview with Anthony Coughlan, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland (Mar. 3, 2006).
Anthony Coughlan is an Irish former academic, and a commentator on Irish engagement
with Europe.
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Interview with Margaret Ward, Women’s Res. & Dev. Agency, Belfast, Ireland (Jan.
29, 2006). Margaret Ward is an Irish historian and human rights activist, and Director of
the Women’s Research and Development Agency, an organisation situated in Belfast and
dedicated to the promotion of women’s equality and rights.
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Interview with Eoin Ó Broin, supra note 53.
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engagement with self-determination through the Gaelic Athletic
Association, which he described as a custodian of Irish cultural pursuits.58
However, several respondents concluded that Irish self-determination has
failed to gain traction as an international legal issue. The right faces two
major obstacles in this context: first, Britain’s international status and its
capacity to shape the “Irish question” as a domestic political problem,59 and
second, the lack of international advocacy on the part of the Irish state.60
Consequently, academic and political commentary has failed to adequately
acknowledge the effects of colonialism on Irish nationalists.61 Those who
have attempted to expose the colonial legacy of British imperialism in
Ireland have been left “without a paradigm to explain inequality, injustice
and repression within the North of Ireland.”62
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Interview with Niall Murphy, Kevin R. Winters & Co. Solicitors, Belfast, Northern
Ireland (Mar. 15, 2006). Niall Murphy is a member of the Irish nationalist community,
and a legal practitioner in Belfast, specialising in human rights.
59
Interview with Professor Christine Bell, Transitional Justice Institute, University of
Ulster, Derry, Northern Ireland (Oct. 27, 2005). Christine Bell is a legal academic
specialising in the study of transitional justice, with origins in the British unionist
community in Northern Ireland. Interview with Anthony Coughlan, supra note 55.
Interview with Terry Enright, supra note 54. Interview with Eoin Ó Broin, supra note 53.
Interview with Mike Ritchie, Coiste na n-Iarchimí, Belfast, Ireland (Dec. 7, 2005). Mike
Ritchie is a community worker, who represents former Irish republican political
prisoners.
60
Interview with Professor Kieran McEvoy, Queens University Belfast, Belfast, Ireland
(Jun. 22, 2006). McEvoy is a legal academic and criminologist, with particular expertise
in relation to political imprisonment. McEvoy is also a long-time committee member of
the Committee for the Administration of Justice, a prominent human rights NGO in
Belfast.
61
Pamela Clayton, Religion, Ethnicity and Colonialism as Explanations of the Northern
Ireland Conflict, in RETHINKING NORTHERN IRELAND 40, 48 (David Miller ed. 1998).
62
Robbie McVeigh, The British/Irish “Peace Process” and the Colonial Legacy, in
DIS/AGREEING IRELAND: CONTEXTS, OBSTACLES, HOPES 27, 28 (James Anderson &
James Goodman eds., 1998).
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B. Aspects of the Historical and Contemporary Irish Nationalist
Experience of Colonialism
In this section, I briefly explore some aspects of the historical and
contemporary Irish nationalist experience of colonialism through the lens of
three themes that emerged from my qualitative research—namely, the
nature of British administration in Northern Ireland, social imperialism and
the colonial mindset, and the suppression of Irish culture. The data from
which these themes emerged support the conclusion that self-determination
retains a contemporary mission of decolonisation, and that selfdetermination for Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland requires renewed
critical evaluation. This section also provides context for Section IV of this
article. In that section, I argue that, in order to ensure the capacity of the
Agreement to promote a just peace, it is essential to acknowledge
contextual matters of colonialism and self-determination.
Advocates for Irish self-determination have typically avoided the
international legal forum as a site for advancing self-determination claims.63
This is noteworthy because international recognition can significantly assist
claimants in asserting and exercising their right to self-determination. It can,
for instance, enable claimants to bolster their claims by referring to
comparable situations in their advocacy.64 It can also develop a broader
support base and provide a much wider range of fora for advancing a self63

Interview with Eoin Ó Broin, supra note 53.
Interview with Professor Robert McCorquodale, University of Nottingham,
Nottingham, UK (Mar. 27, 2006). Robert McCorquodale participated in this research
during the process of interviews relating to the self-determination claims of Irish
nationalists in Northern Ireland. His academic writings are also cited extensively in this
article. McCorquodale is not a member of either major community in Ireland, nor is he
engaged in a self-determination claim there. He was interviewed on the basis of his
expertise in self-determination as a professor of international law, with particular focus
on Britain’s engagement with the right. In this sense, McCorquodale’s participation in
this research is similar to that of Professor Christine Bell, another non-claimant
interviewee, whose expertise has been considered through both her comments in our
interview and her written work.
64
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determination claim. Had Ireland been recognised more widely as a site of
colonialism, advocates may have been able to build on what Adrian Guelke
recognised as the lack of international legitimacy of Northern Ireland as a
political entity.65 Instead, the continued colonial experience of Irish
nationalists in the North of Ireland, and their right to self-determination, has
been under-explored and under-theorised in legal discourse.
In arguing that colonialism relates not to distance, as in the salt-water
archetype of colonialism, but rather to the form of administration, Robert
McCorquodale asked, “Is the type of administration a foreign
administration over those who are different and who don’t share the same
approach?”66 The use of the term “foreign” is complicated in the Northern
Irish context, because over half of the constituents of that jurisdiction
identify themselves as British, “Northern Irish,” or “Ulstermen,” and remain
accepting of British governance. For Irish nationalists and interviewees in
this research, however, British rule is both a foreign and different approach
from how they imagine governance if Ireland were unified.
Like McCorquodale, Bernadette McAliskey rejected the salt-water
approach to colonial categorisation, finding that the British presence in
Ireland has never been appropriately named as colonial, due to the
erroneous perception that colonies must be distant from the imperial
power.67 Further, several participants in this study identified the
unaccountability of the British ruling class as a key signifier of continued
colonialism. Coughlan stated, “the classic characterisation of colonialism
was a subordinate people who had their laws made by others . . . and Britain
65
Adrian Guelke, International Legitimacy, Self-Determination and Northern Ireland,
11 REV. OF INT’L STUD. 37, 38 (1985).
66
Interview with Professor Robert McCorquodale, supra note 64.
67
Interview with Bernadette McAliskey, South Tyrone Empowerment Program,
Dungannon, Northern Ireland (Jun. 7, 2006). Bernadette McAliskey is an Irish republican
and socialist activist and former politician, who continues to contribute to public debate
on the Irish national question and directs the South Tyrone Empowerment Program,
supporting migrant workers.
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does still do that in Northern Ireland.”68 Enright was more explicit in his
condemnation of the unaccountable and distant ruling class of British
politicians and bureaucrats primarily responsible for the governance of
Northern Ireland: “[T]hose people are like a secret society, behind closed
doors, who still think of us as the natives and still think that the natives have
to be told how to live and what to do.”69 For Irish nationalists, selfdetermination would require governance that is accountable and
representative, rather than continued dominance by history’s greatest
imperial power.
Notwithstanding the recent devolution of some powers to a powersharing government in Belfast,70 some participants in this study identified
continued social imperialism as another vestige of colonialism. Northern
Ireland as a quasi-state was constructed for the benefit of its British unionist
population, who for most of its history, have dominated in a broad range of
social fields.71 Ó Broin argued that the legacy of unionist dominance in the
North of Ireland has been the creation of a class of people who “benefited
from the dividends of imperialism,” such as powerful politicians,
professionals, and workers who were able to gain reliable employment in
the shipyards and factories.72 Meanwhile, Irish nationalists in the North

68

Interview with Anthony Coughlan, supra note 55. I note that this assessment remains
accurate, even though some law-making capacity has been devolved to the Northern
Ireland Assembly.
69
Interview with Terry Enright, supra note 54.
70
The Northern Ireland Assembly exercises devolved powers in the areas of agriculture,
culture, education, employment, trade, environment, finance, health, social services and,
since 2010, has power over policing and justice. Devolution Settlement: Northern
Ireland, GOV.UK (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/devolution-settlement-northernireland.
71
Christine Bell & Kathleen Cavanaugh, “Constructive Ambiguity” or Internal SelfDetermination? Self-Determination, Group Accommodation, and the Belfast Agreement,
22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1345, 1351 (1998).
72
Interview with Eoin Ó Broin, supra note 53.
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have suffered marginalisation and discrimination in all aspects of social
life.73
O’Connor developed this argument further, finding that anti-Catholic
sentiment and sectarian conflict has been used to justify British imperialism
in Ireland. O’Connor perceived a legacy of the superiority of one group
over another as a continuing symptom of colonialism:
You cannot take people out of their homes, kill them, starve them,
treat them like shit, for centuries, unless you had something in your
head which told you that they were somehow less than you. You
used religion to do it here, and you use race elsewhere.74
It is clear from such perspectives of the colonised that, whatever future
political settlements might be made, self-determination in Ireland must be
asserted on the basis that all the people of the island have equal entitlement
to rights and recognition.
A further aspect of continued colonial influence identified by Irish
participants in this study was the dominance of British culture over Irish
culture within many areas of social life. O’Connor gave the example of the
use of British points of reference, such as Big Ben, in the textbooks used by
children in schools. For O’Connor’s children, famous sites in London have
no cultural relevance,75 and they would be better served by education that
reflects their Irish identities. As was recognised by Murphy, some of the
key areas in which Irish people assert self-determination lie within the
cultural sphere. In promoting the use of the Irish language, and supporting
Gaelic sports, people claim their cultural identity.76 Often, though, the
British and devolved Northern Irish administrations either fail to support or
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TIM PAT COOGAN, IRELAND IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 125 (2003); MICHAEL
FARRELL, NORTHERN IRELAND: THE ORANGE STATE 326 (2nd ed. 1976).
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Interview with Paul O’Connor, supra note 52.
75
Id.
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Interview with Niall Murphy, supra note 58.
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actively discourage the practice of Irish culture.77 The suppression of Irish
culture reflects and reinforces the continued influence of colonialism,
particularly the notion of the superiority of the colonial culture over the
culture of the colonised. More broadly, testimonies from Irish research
participants in relation to self-determination demonstrate the need to
critically evaluate the Irish peace accord, the Good Friday Agreement, in
the context of the contemporary colonial experience.

III. THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT AND SELF-DETERMINATION
IN IRELAND
As noted above, the self-determination claim of Irish nationalists in the
North of Ireland has not gained traction as an international legal issue, in
part because of the United Kingdom’s capacity to depict the matter as a
domestic political and inter-communal problem. I have argued that it is
essential to expose the contemporary colonial experience of nationalists in
the North of Ireland in order to examine Irish self-determination with an
honest acknowledgment of context. The other essential contextual factor in
relation to contemporary self-determination in Ireland is the Good Friday
Agreement. In this section, I explore the significance of the Agreement in
relation to self-determination, with emphasis on the key provisions of the
77
This is especially apparent currently in relation to the legal protection of the rights of
Irish speakers in Northern Ireland. The British Government committed to the passage of
an Irish Language Act in the St. Andrews Agreement (an Agreement clarifying aspects of
the peace process and devolved government), but has not met this commitment.
Agreement at St Andrews, Ir.-Gr. Brit., Annex B, Oct. 19, 2006, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136651/st_
andrews_agreement-2.pdf. The British unionist parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly
have prevented the passage of an Irish Language Act through that parliament, with
George Robinson of the Democratic Unionist Party describing the Irish language as
“closely identified with IRA terrorism,” and Ulster Unionist David Kennedy arguing that
the nationalist party Sinn Féin use the Irish language “as a kind of warped ideological
jihad.” N. IR. ASSEMBLY OFF. REP. (Oct. 9, 2007)(statements of Mr. G. Robinson and
Mr. Kennedy), available at http://archive.niassembly.gov.uk/record/reports2007/0710
09.htm.
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Agreement and its status as a transitional instrument. In the years ahead, the
Agreement must be continually analysed in terms of its capacity to promote
self-determination.
A. The Value of the Good Friday Agreement in Building SelfDetermination
During the recent conflict in the North of Ireland, several attempts at
securing lasting peace were thwarted or abandoned. The Good Friday
Agreement received mass public support throughout Ireland when it was
made.78 In the challenging years since its acceptance at referenda, the
Agreement has not been abandoned by any of the mainstream political
parties. In fact, the Democratic Unionist Party, which rejected the
Agreement at the time of negotiations, is now the largest party in the
consociational79 parliament established under the Agreement. The
Agreement is generally accepted as the foundation of political progress in
Northern Ireland, and between the Irish jurisdictions and the Irish and
British states. I argue that the Agreement can also facilitate transitional
justice in Ireland by taking into account the demands of the right to selfdetermination.
General consensus on the importance of the Agreement among political
leaders was demonstrated in March 2009, when dissident Irish republicans80
78

In Northern Ireland, 71.1 percent of voters answered “yes” to the referendum question:
“Do you support the Agreement reached at the multi-party talks on Northern Ireland and
set out in command paper 3833?” In the Republic of Ireland, 94.4 percent of voters
agreed to a change to the Irish Constitution, to enable the operation of the Agreement.
Nicholas Whyte, Northern Ireland Elections: The 1998 Referendums, ARK (Feb. 17,
2002), http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/fref98.htm.
79
Consociational government is a model that guarantees group representation in political
institutions and seeks to avoid majority dominance. It was adopted in Northern Ireland as
a suitable model for enabling political transition following inter-communal conflict.
80
“Dissident” is a commonly used phrase to describe Irish republican militants and
political activists who dissent from the recent shift in Irish republicanism towards purely
political activism, and its associated compromises.
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claimed responsibility for the shooting deaths of two British soldiers in
Antrim and a policeman in Craigavon, two towns outside Belfast.81 These
events raised fears of a severe threat to the peace process. Unionist and
nationalist political leaders united in their condemnation of the threat. Then
British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Shaun Woodward, called the
peace process “unstoppable.”82 Deputy Chief Minister of the Northern
Ireland Assembly, Martin McGuinness of Sinn Féin, made a particularly
strong statement. McGuinness was previously an IRA commander and
supporter of the political war against the British occupation of the North of
Ireland. However, he said: “[T]hese people [the gunmen] are traitors to the
island of Ireland; they have betrayed the political desires, hopes and
aspirations of all of the people who live on this island. They don’t deserve
to be supported by anyone.”83
The political leaders’ desperation to preserve the peace at this time
proves their belief that the Agreement is an instrument that is too essential
to peaceful progress to be abandoned. Indeed, according to journalist John
Ware, the fact that British unionist politicians declined an opportunity to
use the killings for political mileage against their nationalist opponents
“suggests the peace process is going from strength to strength.”84
In May 2014, this conclusion was tested by the four-day arrest and
detainment of Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams by the Police Service of
Northern Ireland for questioning in relation to the 1972 abduction and
murder of Belfast mother Jean McConville. His arrest raised concerns
81

Henry McDonald, “Real IRA Claims’ Murder of Soldiers in Northern Ireland, THE
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Id.
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John Ware, Real IRA Hits Back at the Heretics, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Mar. 12,
2009,
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/real-ira-hits-back-at-the-heretics-200903118v53.html?skin=text-only.
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regarding the stability of the peace process, particularly in light of
comments from other Sinn Féin members that the timing of the arrest was
politically motivated, with European parliament and local government
elections approaching. Martin McGuinness was quoted as saying that “dark
forces” opposed to the peace process continued to operate within the Police
Service of Northern Ireland, and that Sinn Féin would have to review its
support for the police if Adams was charged.85 The arrest of Adams was
controversial, particularly because it highlighted two issues that continue to
divide public opinion: “the pardoning of militants, and the confidence of all
sides in the neutrality of the police.”86 Adams himself, following his release,
maintained his innocence, stated his continued support for “civic,
accountable, public service policing”87 and his resolve to continue to “build
the peace.”88 He said that “there can be no going back—peace needs to be
built with a consistent and determined focus.”89 Such responses to recent
major threats to peace in the North of Ireland demonstrate the centrality of
the Good Friday Agreement—and its machinery of peace—in the political
outlook of representatives from both Irish nationalist and British unionist
perspectives.
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Gerry Adams Arrested: PSNI to Ask for More Time to Quiz Sinn Fein Leader over
Jean McConville’s Murder, BELFAST TELEGRAPH, May 2, 2014, http://www.belfast
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87
Gerry Adams, The Jean McConville Killing: I’m Completely Innocent. But What Were
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http://www.reuters.com/video/2014/05/04/gerry-adams-walks-free-followingmcconvi?videoId=312826364.
89
Gerry Adams Press Conference, BBC NI (May 4, 2014), available at https://ww
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Commentators from a wide range of perspectives have repeatedly
described the Good Friday Agreement as immensely significant. According
to Colin Harvey, the Agreement is “constitutive” and must underpin all
future constitutional developments in Northern Ireland.90 Former Taoiseach
(Irish Prime Minister) Bertie Ahern regarded the Agreement as “truly
historic” because it was the first time since 1918 that “the people of Ireland
voted on the same day to determine the future of the entire island.”91 Bell
and Cavanaugh assert that, while the Agreement is filled with “constructive
ambiguities” designed to facilitate the settlement, the vote of the people of
the island in favour of it could be argued to be an exercise in selfdetermination, in that the people expressed their desire for the Agreement to
form the foundation for devolved government and political progress.92
Rodgers finds that the Agreement “is self-determination,” because of its
wide public acceptance—as demonstrated through referenda.93
The involvement of all the people of Ireland signaled that the future of
self-determination is necessarily an ongoing question, to be jointly
addressed by the people of both jurisdictions. Indeed, “the Agreement’s
institutions are being created by the will of the people of Ireland, North and
South, and not just by the people of Northern Ireland.”94 Mike Ritchie
expressed a nationalist perspective on this aspect of the Agreement: “[A]
reading of the Good Friday Agreement shows that the unit of selfdetermination is quite clearly the Irish people.”95 Ritchie’s perspective
90
Colin J. Harvey, The New Beginning: Reconstructing Constitutional Law and
Democracy in Northern Ireland, in HUMAN RIGHTS, EQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC
RENEWAL IN NORTHERN IRELAND 9, 36 (Colin J Harvey ed., 2001).
91
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92
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demonstrates the ongoing aspirational value of the Agreement; it is not only
a means of establishing and institutionalising the peace process, but also
sets a foundation for broader social change, including the realisation of selfdetermination.
B. Key Provisions of the Good Friday Agreement and “Constructive
Ambiguity”
The Good Friday Agreement begins with a declaration by all the
negotiating parties of their support for the negotiated provisions—as a basis
on which to build reconciliation and a new, shared future.96 The negotiating
parties then endorse the decision of the British and Irish governments to:
(i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised
by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its
status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with
Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland;
(ii) recognise that it is for the people of the island of Ireland alone,
by agreement between the two parts respectively and without
external impediment, to exercise their right of self-determination
on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and
South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish,
accepting that this right must be achieved and exercised with and
subject to the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of
Northern Ireland.97
The effect of these provisions is that the two governments withdraw their
stake in the future constitutional status of Northern Ireland, and agree that
any change is entirely subject to the will of the people. In this sense, the
Agreement represents a modern, democratic approach to sovereignty.98 This
96

Good Friday Agreement, supra note 8, at 1, Declaration of Support.
Id. at 2. Constitutional Issues [1].
98
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shift can put issues of self-determination truly within the hands of the
people of the North of Ireland.
The Agreement provides for constitutional change by requiring the
British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland to trigger a poll “if at any
time it appears likely to him that a majority of those voting would express a
wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom
and form part of a united Ireland.”99
Should a poll be held and fail, at least seven years must pass before
another poll could be held.100 As yet, no poll has been held and there has
been no demand made for such a poll because Irish nationalists (and voters
in favour of the unification of the Irish jurisdictions) remain in the minority
of voters in the North of Ireland.101 Therefore this element of the Agreement
remains a largely unexplored—but very important—provision with regards
to self-determination.
The Agreement also acknowledges the right of the people of the North of
Ireland to identify and be recognised as British or Irish or both, regardless
of any potential future change in the territory’s constitutional status.102 This
provision is important for Irish nationalists now, considering their
experience of systemic discrimination on the basis of their communal
identity. It may be of great significance to British unionists in a potential
future united Ireland. In that case, the protection for self-identification set
out in the Agreement would require sensitive and creative methods of statecolonial borders upon the achievement of independent statehood. Frontier Dispute Case
(Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali) 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22).
99
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100
Id. at 2. Constitutional Issues, Schedule 1 [3].
101
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building and governance to ensure that a British minority in Ireland would
not suffer systemic discrimination.
Strand One of the Agreement provides for the establishment of a
consociational Northern Ireland Assembly.103 The Assembly exercises
devolved powers in the areas of agriculture, culture, education,
employment, trade, environment, finance, health, social services, and—
since 2010—policing and justice.104 Powers in other areas are reserved by
the British government in Westminster. The rules of the Assembly are
designed to ensure cross-community participation and support for
legislation and executive decisions. Certain key decisions may only be
taken with either a majority of all members voting, including a majority of
members of both unionist and nationalist designation, or a 60 percent
majority of all members voting, including at least 40 percent of members
from both unionist and nationalist designations.105 A First Minister and
Deputy First Minister, elected from the two largest parties in the Assembly,
are jointly responsible for overseeing the exercise of executive powers by
Ministers, who are in turn elected by proportional representation.106
Strand Two of the Agreement aims to strengthen cooperation between the
northern and southern Irish jurisdictions through a North-South Ministerial
Council. This Council comprises members of the executive governments of
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, who meet together regularly
to cooperate on matters of mutual concern and cross-border issues.107 The
six areas of cooperation currently include agriculture, education,
environment, health, tourism, and transport.108 There have been several
103
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periods since the Assembly’s establishment when it has been suspended,
due to disagreements between parties, and during these periods the
Ministerial Council has not functioned according to its remit.
Strand Three of the Agreement establishes a British-Irish Council, which
aims to further relationships and cooperation between the British and Irish
governments, as well as with the devolved governments in Northern
Ireland, Scotland, and Wales.109 Strand Three also establishes a British-Irish
Intergovernmental Conference, which brings together Ministers of each
government. Meetings are sometimes convened to enable the Irish
government to put forward views and proposals on matters that are not
devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly, but are of special interest to the
Irish state.110 These measures have been recognised as distinctive and
significant in relation to self-determination under international law.
According to Geoff Gilbert, Colin Warbrick, and Dominic McGoldrick,
“the level of participation for the minority group and especially the kinState is more than is required by any international instrument.”111 Again,
this demonstrates the capacity of the Agreement to put issues of selfdetermination into the hands of the peoples involved.
Essential to the Good Friday Agreement are the provisions concerning
protection of human rights. These provisions particularly emphasise values
of equality, non-sectarianism, freedom of religious and political expression,
and non-discrimination.112 The British government pledged to incorporate
into Northern Ireland law the European Convention on Human Rights, and
to establish the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and an
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Equality Commission.113 The Irish government committed to establishing
an equivalent Human Rights Commission.114 The Agreement emphasises
the importance of reconciliation and of acknowledging the experiences of
victims of conflict.115 According to Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams, the
Agreement provides a “peaceful and democratic” way to achieve a “citizencentred, rights-based society.”116 The Agreement’s provisions on human
rights should be read in the context of its recognition of the right to selfdetermination,117 which is more broadly recognised as the foundation
principle for the contemporary human rights framework under international
law.118
The Agreement has been described by Bell and Cavanaugh as an exercise
in “constructive ambiguity.”119 This is a political device used to gain
agreement on a disputed text. While in this case the constructive ambiguity
of the Agreement produced positive results in terms of the peace process, it
also created some uncertainty in relation to key terms.120 The central
ambiguity in the Good Friday Agreement relates to the “unit” of selfdetermination that it is said to create. The Agreement first vests a decision
on future constitutional change in “the majority of the people of Northern
Ireland.”121 However, in the next paragraph, the Agreement identifies selfdetermination as a right to be exercised by “the people of the island of
Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively and without
external impediment.”122
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While these provisions appear to conflict, the use of these two different
categories need not be interpreted as a source of confusion. Bell and
Cavanaugh argue that reference to the two competing groups boosts the
legitimacy of the Agreement, and confirms the right of all the people of the
island to involvement in future self-determination solutions.123 In giving
both the people of the North of Ireland and the people of the island of
Ireland a place within this central provision, the Agreement acknowledges
that each jurisdiction has unique features, and that the two must collaborate
if constitutional change is to occur. The constructive ambiguity of these
essential provisions also enables either of the two potential future
outcomes—continued union with Britain or the creation of a united
Ireland—to be achieved in the context of the legal protections offered by the
Agreement.

IV. ASSESSING THE CAPACITY OF THE AGREEMENT TO PROMOTE A
JUST PEACE
The Good Friday Agreement makes no assumptions about future
constitutional settlements, but instead offers either the continuation of the
union with Britain or the establishment of a united Ireland as alternative
future outcomes. This flexibility is bolstered by the commitments made by
the two governments that they have no vested interest in either outcome,
and that they are bound to facilitate whichever outcome expresses the will
of the majority of the people.124 Therefore, the Agreement is a transitional
rather than a final settlement. It was intended to bring an end to violent
political conflict while enabling the different communities to continue to
debate their future status through democratic means.125 As discussed below,
the Agreement does not set out a comprehensive framework for conflict
123
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resolution or reconciliation, thus demonstrating that a dialogue on
establishing a just peace must be maintained.
The openness of the Agreement necessitates an ongoing conversation
regarding the constitutional arrangements on the island of Ireland, and how
potential change might affect its people. Discussion regarding whether and
how change might occur in Ireland is essential to avoid extending the
suffering imposed on Irish nationalists through partition and colonial
domination to future generations. This proposed conversation requires
contributions influenced by international legal considerations—particularly
the right of self-determination. Indeed, it has been argued that international
law explains the Good Friday Agreement more effectively than other legal
approaches.126 In the following sections, I note several matters of priority in
relation to the development of a just peace in Northern Ireland: the need to
acknowledge colonialism and provide for transitional justice, the full
significance of the consent principle in the Agreement, and the potential for
an inclusive self-determination solution in Ireland.
A. The Need to Acknowledge Colonialism and Provide for Transitional
Justice
In Section II of this article, I argued that the colonial experience of Irish
nationalists must be acknowledged in order to move forward with a truthful
awareness of their historical context, and to progress the essential debate on
Ireland’s constitutional future. While the Good Friday Agreement appears
to respect the legitimacy of two competing political aspirations—British
unionism and Irish nationalism—it does not name colonialism as a
fundamental contextual experience for the territory or its peoples. This is a
troubling gap in the Agreement, as is the absence of acknowledgment that
the British state had an active role in the conflict in Ireland.
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However, considering that the primary goal at the time of negotiations
was to facilitate the end to violent conflict, it is unsurprising that the
Agreement is flawed in these ways. In McAliskey’s conception, the
negotiations leading to the Agreement were concerned with how the
conflict “could be managed out of existence,” rather than with conflict
resolution.127 This assertion is supported by the findings of Campbell, Ní
Aoláin, and Harvey that the Agreement deals little with the past and the
legacies of the conflict,128 but rather aims to transform a violent conflict into
a political conflict.129 Cillian McGrattan concurs, finding that historic
wrongs, victims, reconciliation, and truth-telling have been largely
marginalised in the Agreement and its operation post-1998.130 In the future,
effective transitional justice processes will be required in order to
adequately acknowledge matters of colonialism and self-determination, and
to facilitate the establishment of a just peace in the North of Ireland.
As discussed in the introduction of this article, transitional justice is a set
of scholarly inquiries concerned with societies in post-conflict transition.131
Transitional justice inquiries focus on human rights and seek redemptive
visions for justice after conflict.132 Justice is conceived of as a conditional,
rather than an absolute quality; that is to say, what a society deems just
during post-conflict transition will depend on the nature of the injustices
perpetrated during the conflict.133 In this context, truth-telling and dealing
with the past become central concerns for transitional justice enquiries.134
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It is not possible to adequately address the range of transitional justice
enquiries relating to Northern Ireland in this article. However, it is
important to explore truth-telling and reconciliation. Efforts to develop such
mechanisms have arguably been hampered by the lack of acknowledgment
of the colonial experience or the self-determination claim of Irish nationalist
people in the North of Ireland. The peace process in Ireland has not led the
British state to address its active involvement in the conflict. As efforts to
develop transitional justice processes have advanced since 1998, “the
United Kingdom has sought to contain the implications of the Northern
Ireland transitionary process to the geographical location of the conflict.”135
In 2007, legislation was passed at Westminster that limits the Commission’s
investigative powers. The legislation prevents the Commission from
investigating any intelligence services or their members, or from inquiring
into whether intelligence services have violated the human rights of
individuals in the community.136 This parliamentary limitation is
characteristic of the British state’s long-standing position that it serves as
the neutral arbiter between two “warring tribes,” or what is known as the
“community relations” analysis of the conflict in Ireland.137 Britain’s
projection of itself as an arbiter and promoter of equality138 significantly
hampers its capacity to transform the social institutions of Northern
Ireland139 through which colonialism has been perpetuated, and thus
hampers its capacity to help facilitate the establishment of a just peace.
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A mechanism for truth-telling and addressing the past would significantly
bolster the capacity of the Agreement to promote true peace and
reconciliation. Indeed, former British cabinet minister and Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland, Shaun Woodward, wrote in 2014 that the peace
process can always unravel, “[s]o long as Northern Ireland avoids settling
on a mechanism to deal justly and fairly with its past.”140 Kelman argues
that the process of identity change, which is essential to conflict resolution,
requires, among other things, “a common moral basis for peace . . .
consistent with the principles of fairness and attainable justice” and
“admitting the other’s truth into one’s own narrative.”141 Woodward
recommended that the British government fund a review of potential
mechanisms, and commit (in advance of the review) to putting its
recommendations to a referendum.142 In 2007, the British and Northern Irish
governments established a Consultative Group on the Past, chaired by the
former Primate of the Church of Ireland143 and a former Catholic priest. The
Group delivered its report in 2009,144 and recommended a raft of measures
that could together have established “an overall mechanism for dealing with
the past.”145 Instead, the report was met with summary rejection from the
British and Northern Irish governments and its recommendations have not
been adopted.146
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Should the peace process develop to a point of supporting a truth and
reconciliation process, international oversight would be essential,147 as
became clear in the aftermath of the release of the report of the Consultative
Group on the Past in 2009. Public and political reactions to this report have
been volatile. Former British unionist leader David Trimble found offensive
the notion that the families of all those killed during the conflict should
receive a compensation payment, as this proposal equated the experiences
of victims’ families regardless of whether the victims were civilians, police,
soldiers, or paramilitaries.148 The Consultative Group rebutted this view in
its report, which concluded that any hierarchy of victims of the conflict is
sectarian,149 and ought to be rejected to prevent the politicisation of
victimhood.150 However, some nationalist politicians also argued that the
Group’s proposals were inherently flawed because the Group’s members
were appointed by the British government, its report failed to implicate the
British state as a participant in the conflict, and it appeared to rule out the
possibility of independent internationally convened inquiries into
controversial incidents.151
The need for a holistic approach to the peace process in Ireland—that is,
one that accounts for rights issues and reconciliation issues—was supported
by recent qualitative research conducted in Northern Ireland with rights and
147
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reconciliation advocates. In this study, Maggie Beirne and Colin Knox note
that the rights and reconciliation approaches are each limited in terms of
their capacities to produce true resolution of the conflict in Northern
Ireland.152 They note that advocates for human rights-focused approaches to
peace-building can appear too focused on international legal standards to
“successfully affect local realities and divisions.”153 Further, Beirne and
Knox find that advocates who privilege reconciliation over rights may focus
on the bottom-up generation of new relationships, yet fail to adequately
address the “power differentials between those being reconciled” or “the
role of the state in creating and maintaining divisions.”154 Beirne and Knox
argue for a collaborative approach to peace building between rights and
reconciliation advocates and movements in Northern Ireland in a way that
mirrors my argument that the peace process must be pursued in the context
of the fundamental issues of colonialism, self-determination, and
transitional justice.
B. Recognising the Full Significance of the Consent Principle
The “consent principle,” essential to the Good Friday Agreement, means
that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland is no longer—at least in
legal terms—subject to the will of the British state. Instead, it is said to
depend on the will of a majority of its people, and requires Britain to give
effect to any future change it may wish to make.155 Campbell, Ní Aoláin,
and Harvey argue that this principle demonstrates that the Agreement
makes a creative contribution to the development of the international law on
the transfer of sovereignty: “No longer is territorial cession about the
transfer of sovereignty by means of an agreement between ceding and
152
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acquiring state, but rather the ceding of the decisive power to citizenry
itself, with the prior consent of the implicated states.”156
The British state’s acceptance of this shift, enabling the citizenry to
exercise control of constitutional and territorial status through elections, “is
a radical reconfiguration of both the theory and practice of state
formation.”157 It is an official acknowledgment that Northern Ireland has a
right to secede and join a union with the Republic of Ireland, if that is the
wish of the people.158 It is important that the consent principle be
understood in this sense, rather than confined by an interpretation that
emphasises the protection that the consent principle offers to the preferences
of the British unionist majority.
It is certainly true that the consent principle operates to ensure that
unionists cannot be forced into a united Ireland while they remain a
majority in Northern Ireland. Some Irish nationalists would regard the
consent principle as the equivalent of the unionist “veto,”159 which militant
nationalism always resisted during the political conflict. Prior to the
development of consociational mechanisms through the Good Friday
Agreement, unionists were seen to be exercising a veto over claims for Irish
unification, and were supported in this through the force of the British
state.160 Indeed, some Irish nationalists opposed to the Agreement continue
to argue that their former comrades, many now Sinn Féin politicians and
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members of the Northern Ireland Assembly, have accepted a unionist veto
despite claiming they would never do so during the conflict.161
However, the consent principle may be interpreted in a more positive
light from the Irish nationalist perspective. For example, Rodgers believes
the significance of the Good Friday Agreement is that it recognises the
legitimacy of both nationalist and unionist perspectives.162 She adds that by
incorporating the consent principle, the Agreement enables both nationalists
and unionists to advocate peacefully for their desired ends.163 The consent
principle undoubtedly represents a compromise on the part of nationalists,
some of whom previously did not accept the need to secure majority
support for constitutional change, instead arguing that British rule in the
North of Ireland is inherently wrong and ought to be immediately ended.164
However, alongside the consent principle’s majority protection offered to
the British unionist community, the principle’s complementary and novel
protection is now offered to Irish nationalists in the Agreement through
Britain’s hugely significant commitment to respect whatever choice the
people make. This commitment is yet to be tested, but Britain has
committed itself in formal legal terms. This represents a massive shift in the
British position, considering both its historical reluctance to accept the
weakening of its empire and its vehement and long-term opposition to
militant Irish republicanism.
Importantly, the notion that future constitutional change will only come
through political rather than violent means was a key factor in securing
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majority support for the popular referenda that confirmed the Agreement.165
It was this shift that enabled veteran Irish nationalist leader Gerry Adams to
conclude: “The Good Friday Agreement is the people’s agreement. It does
not belong to the elites. It must be defended, implemented and
promoted.”166 Furthermore, it is this type of interpretation of the Agreement
and its potential that can absorb an acknowledgment of the colonial
experience of Irish nationalists and their legitimate claim to selfdetermination, while simultaneously promoting the achievement of a just
peace in Ireland.
C. The Potential for an Inclusive, All-Island Self-determination
Solution
The Good Friday Agreement provides legal and political confirmation
that Irish unification is a potential future outcome. According to Bertie
Ahern, the Agreement makes the people truly sovereign for the first time,
and establishes a mechanism of consent through which the people of the
island may choose to exercise the right of self-determination and unite as
one sovereign Irish state.167 Therefore, the Agreement has the capacity to
enable an eventual all-island self-determination settlement in three senses.
First, any future change will be required to consider the interests of all
communities on the island. Second, and crucially for Irish nationalists, the
unification of the two jurisdictions is now accepted as a legitimate political
goal. Third, the Agreement confirms that nationalists are equally entitled to
advance their political aspirations through peaceful means.168
165

The notion that future constitutional change will only come through political rather
than violent means was demonstrated by the high levels of support in the dual referenda,
which implicitly asked if voters preferred a power-sharing deal agreed by numerous
political parties and the sponsoring governments of Britain and Ireland.
166
Adams, supra note 87.
167
Bertie Ahern, The Good Friday Agreement: An Overview, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1196, 1196 (1998).
168
Good Friday Agreement, supra note 8, at 1. Declaration of Support [5].

LAW, PEACE, AND VIOLENCE

Self-Determination, Justice, and a “Peace Process”

The island status of Ireland is significant in terms of international opinion
regarding the success of the settlement contained in the Good Friday
Agreement. Guelke’s argument that the current borders and status of
Northern Ireland lack international legitimacy169 has often been cited.170 He
notes that the all-Ireland dimensions of the Agreement—for example, the
North-South Ministerial Council and cross-border implementation bodies—
were accepted internationally as guarantees that the Agreement was not
partitionist and would not stand as an obstacle to “the eventual outcome of a
united Ireland.”171 Guelke’s view demonstrates why the cross-border
dimensions of the Agreement, which confirm that the Agreement is
concerned with the self-determination of all the people of the island, were
so fundamental to securing Irish nationalist agreement. In responding to the
1995 Forum for Peace and Reconciliation, an important consultation
process conducted three years before the Agreement was reached, Sinn Féin
stated: “What is required is a new and imaginative approach which tilts the
balance away from the prohibitive and negative power of veto towards the
positive power of consent, of considering consent, of negotiating
consent.”172 As discussed above, the Agreement now provides for such a
positive conception of the role of consent in future constitutional debates.
The mass support for the peaceful political process set out in the Good
Friday Agreement demonstrates popular acceptance of the importance of
inclusivity in relation to self-determination in contemporary Ireland. An
169
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inclusive approach does not require a particular community to abandon its
own history or aspirations, as I have argued in this article in relation to Irish
nationalists. However, as O’Connor explains, inclusiveness does require a
more plural conception of self-determination:
[Y]ou put everything that’s important to you in your life into bags,
and that’s your history and you shouldn’t leave that behind. We
need to come at it as who we are [as Irish nationalists] and
recognise that it’s important who we are, but also make space. So
someone will suggest that in a new structure [for example, a united
Ireland] unionists can maintain a British passport—sure, why not?
That doesn’t take away my right. I almost find self-determination a
more useful phrase in describing what I want than a united
Ireland—a united Ireland seems to be saying “I want a unit, that
we control,” which could seem exclusive. Self-determination
means that Protestants, Catholics, working class, middle class . . .
self-determine their lives.173
This approach would necessitate the preservation of the minority rights
protections incorporated in the Agreement in any new constitutional
arrangement. The aim would be to ensure that Irish self-determination
means the highest possible level of self-determination and rights protections
for everyone on the island, including those who do not express an Irish
national identity.
Following the Good Friday Agreement, and as a demonstration of its
willingness to respect the choice of a majority in Northern Ireland, the UK
Parliament repealed the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 (UK).174 This
statute had enabled the partition of Ireland. In turn, the electorate of the
Republic of Ireland agreed through referendum to change Articles 2 and 3
of the Irish Constitution, as a condition of the voters’ acceptance of the
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Agreement.175 Article 2 of the Constitution had previously asserted a
territorial claim over the whole of the island of Ireland.176 Following the
post-Agreement amendment, Article 2 now affirms “the entitlement and
birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its
islands and seas, to be part of the Irish Nation.”177 The earlier form of
Article 3 anticipated “the re-integration of the national territory” and
affirmed “the right of the Parliament and Government established by this
Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that territory.”178
Article 3 no longer claims the right of the Irish Parliament to govern the
whole island. Instead it recognises
the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite
all the people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all
the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a
united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with
the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed,
in both jurisdictions in the island.179
Arguably, these changes were essential to facilitate an inclusive future
self-determination solution for Ireland. According to Kieran McEvoy, the
changes encouraged nationalists to “think more deeply about
accommodating unionist tradition within the island of Ireland” and to
recognise “that self-determination is not simply about the expression of
one’s own rights, but is about the accommodation of the rights of the
other.”180 Coughlan agrees that the Agreement and consequent amendments
to the Irish Constitution ensure the extension of minority rights to British
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unionist people, should the Irish jurisdictions be united.181 These
developments might, for example, enable unionists “to retain British
citizenship as a complex of legal rights” within an Irish state.182
In Part IV of this article, I have argued that the twin goals of justice and
peace may be pursued through three parallel endeavours: (1) acknowledging
colonialism and its impacts in Ireland, and providing for transitional justice
in that context; (2) exploring the full significance of the consent principle in
the Good Friday Agreement; and (3) considering the possibility of an
inclusive self-determination resolution in Ireland. Foundation transitional
justice theorist Ruti Teitel has demonstrated that post conflict transitions
“imply paradigm shifts in the conception of justice.”183 The processes I have
advocated for in this article have the potential to encourage such paradigm
shifts and encourage the development of a peace process that looks to the
past and its injustices, while also aiming for a new dispensation for peace in
the future.

V. CONCLUSION
In his seminal book States of Denial, Stanley Cohen asked: “what do we
do with our knowledge about the suffering of others, and what does this
knowledge do to us?”184 This article has attended to Cohen’s concern in
relation to the Irish peace process by positioning the contemporary colonial
experience of Irish nationalists in the North of Ireland as an essential
starting point in an honest evaluation of self-determination in Ireland. The
colonial experience of Irish nationalists has inflicted injustice and poses an
obstacle to the achievement of a just peace. The fact that neither the colonial
experience of Irish nationalists nor the role of the British state in the conflict
181
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has yet been adequately acknowledged demonstrates that the Irish peace
process has not achieved conflict resolution or reconciliation.185
However, the Good Friday Agreement is a living document, capable of
facilitating flexible solutions to a potential constitutional change in Ireland.
It has encouraged sections of the Irish nationalist community to shift from
political violence towards negotiation as a means of furthering their selfdetermination claims. Representatives of the Irish and British communities
now sit at the same table, a circumstance that would have been unthinkable
20 years ago. The Agreement can be implemented in the future to develop
conflict resolution and reconciliation opportunities, including a truth-telling
mechanism, which in turn can generate transitional justice. As demonstrated
in the final two sections of this article, confronting the experience of
colonialism need not stand in the way of developing an inclusive selfdetermination solution in Ireland, and ought not stand in the way of
establishing a just peace.
I opened this article with a reference to Freedland’s recent argument that
the people of Northern Ireland face a choice between justice or peace: “We
may want both; we may cry out for both. But the bleak truth is we cannot
have both.”186 My argument is that this type of peace-justice binary is
defeatist and unproductive. Of course, the peace and the justice that can be
achieved in the North of Ireland may prove imperfect. However, just as
relative peace is preferable to widespread conflict, so is an honest effort at
delivering transitional justice preferable to marginalising truth and ignoring
injustice in the hope that wounds will miraculously heal themselves.
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